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Abstract
Cryptographic algorithms which take into account requirements for varying levels of secu-
rity and reduced power consumption in embedded devices are now receiving additional at-
tention. The NTRUEncrypt algorithm has been shown to provide certain advantages when
designing low power and resource constrained systems, while still providing comparable
security levels to higher complexity algorithms.
The research presented in this thesis starts with an examination of the general NTRU-
Encrypt system, followed by a more practical examination with respect to the IEEE 1363.1
draft standard. In contrast to previous research, the focus is shifted away from specific opti-
mizations but rather provides a study of many of the recommended practices and suggested
optimizations with particular emphasis on polynomial arithmetic and parameter selection.
Various methods are examined for storing, inverting and multiplying polynomials used in
the system. Recommendations for algorithm and parameter selection are made regarding
implementation in software and hardware with respect to the resources available.
Although the underlying mathematical principles have not been significantly ques-
tioned, stable recommended practices are still being developed for the NTRUEncrypt sys-
tem. As a further complication, recommended optimizations have come from various re-
searchers and have been split between hardware and software implementations. In this the-
sis, a generic VHDL model is presented, based on the IEEE 1363.1 draft standard, which is
designed for adaptation to software or hardware implementation while providing flexibility
for changes in recommended practices.
iv
Contents
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Cryptanalysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2 Private-key cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Public-key cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3.1 Classical public-key cryptosystems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.4 Application of public-key cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 NTRU background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1 NTRU Public-key Cryptosystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.1 Convolution polynomial rings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.1.2 Basic parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.3 NTRU key generation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
2.1.4 NTRU encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.5 NTRU decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1.5.1 Why decryption works . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 Standards . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.2.1 IEEE 1363.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.1.1 Supporting algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2.1.2 Optimizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2.1.3 Security levels and parameter selection . . . . . . . . . . 15
3 NTRU investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.1 Previous work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
3.2 NTRU design and modeling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3.2.1 Design considerations for a general NTRU system . . . . . . . . . 19
v
3.2.2 Detailed aspects of IEEE 1363.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2.3 VHDL modeling of an IEEE 1363.1 system . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2.4 System model testing and results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4 Discussion and analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.1 System dependent design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
4.2 Storage methods and the relation to N and q . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
4.3 Polynomial inversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.4 Considerations for parallelism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
5.1 Future of NTRU . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.2 Future work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
vi
Chapter 1
Introduction
At the most basic level, cryptography is used to allow two or more parties to communicate
over an insecure channel without an unwanted party being able to interpret what is being
transmitted [1]. To accomplish this goal, an intelligible message, or plaintext, is converted
using some sort of encryption rule into an unintelligible message, or ciphertext. In order
to obtain the original message from the ciphertext, a decryption rule is used to reverse the
encryption rule. A key is used in both encryption and decryption to provide a common el-
ement for reversal. All of these elements combine to define a cryptosystem which contains
[1]:
1. A finite plaintext space P
2. A finite ciphertext space C
3. A finite keyspace K
4. A set E of encryption rules and a set D of decryption rules which allow, given a
K ∈ K, to define an encryption rule eK ∈ E and decryption rule dK ∈ D. The rules
eK : P → C and dK : C → P operate on each plaintext element x ∈ P such that
dK(eK(x))) = x.
A cryptosystem can additionally be defined by cryptographic primitives and/or cryp-
tographic protocols. A cryptographic primitive is a basic set of mathematical operations
used to define a method of accomplishing a particular task. In the view of a full cryptosys-
tem, the implementation specifics of encryption, decryption or the method to generate a
key or keys could be considered a cryptographic primitive. A cryptographic primitive is
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not intended to be secure by itself, but rather used as a building block to construct a full
cryptosystem. Cryptographic protocols are descriptions of how cryptographic algorithms
should be used. A cryptosystem is not necessarily secure if it is used in an improper way, so
cryptographic protocols are defined to provide details on aspects such as key establishment
or authentication.
1.1 Cryptanalysis
Cryptanalysis is the study of methods used to obtain private information, most frequently to
obtain the key used for decrypting messages, through examination of available information,
usually ciphertexts. In early cryptographic systems, little or no attempt was made to dis-
guise the operation of encryption. For a time when literacy was not widespread, this could
be considered a valid approach assuming that anyone intercepting an encrypted message
was most likely not competent enough to decrypt it. As education and publications became
available to a larger audience, efforts were made to establish certain aspects for cryptogra-
phy that would allow for the analysis of how secure a method or system would be. Auguste
Kerckhoffs developed a list of principles, including the idea that a cryptosystem should
be secure even if the details of the system are publicly available, excluding the secret key
[2]. To establish an idea of how secure a system is, the concept of defining the amount of
computational power needed to break a system was developed. Although Claude Shannon
was able to prove that the one-time pad cipher is unbreakable under the proper conditions
[3], the one-time pad cipher is considered impractical to implement due to the difficulty
of generating random numbers and the risks involved in distributing the long keys needed
for the cipher. Modern systems implement much shorter keys and use computational effort
based on the best known attack against the system as a measure of security. To evaluate a
system, a certain set of assumptions are applied including an attack model. Attack models
define the type and amount of information available to an attacker. Common attack models
include the ciphertext only attack, the known plaintext attack, the chosen ciphertext attack
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and the chosen plaintext attack. In the ciphertext only attack, the attacker has access to
a ciphertext. A known plaintext attack is one in which a plaintext and the corresponding
ciphertext are known to the attacker. The chosen plaintext attack assumes the attacker has
access to the encryption method to input chosen plaintexts and receive the corresponding
ciphertexts. Gaining access to the decryption method in order to input chosen ciphertexts
and obtain the corresponding plaintexts is the chosen plaintext attack. In most cases, the
worse case attack model is used for a particular system in order to generate a minimum
known security level.
1.2 Private-key cryptography
Symmetric-key or private-key cryptography systems use identical or simplistically related
keys for encryption and decryption. In a case where a secure channel exists, a private
key can be communicated between parties. Subsequent communication can proceed on
an insecure channel without comprising data under the assumption that no other party has
the private key available to decrypt messages. Private-key cryptographic systems balance
the requirement of securely communicating the private key with encryption and decryption
processes that require comparatively low computational effort. Cryptanalysis of a private-
key system will attempt to recover the private key through analysis of message data or
perhaps physical system behavior.
1.3 Public-key cryptography
Public-key cryptography, first introduced in 1976 by Diffie and Hellman [4], is a scheme
used to securely communicate over insecure channels without a previously established se-
cure channel. Secure transmission is established through the use of a public and private
key. Each party retains a non-shared private key and shares their public key with users who
wish to communicate with them. The sender then encrypts messages using the receiver’s
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public key and the receiver decrypts the messages using their private key. Public-key cryp-
tographic systems balance the ability to communicate on insecure channels with higher
complexity encryption and decryption methods that are assumed to be computationally in-
feasible to break. Due to the public key being assumed to be widely available, a public-key
cryptosystem should be constructed such that information about the private key cannot be
determined using information about the public key. An array of distribution issues come
with publicly available information. Authentication of ownership is needed to establish
that a particular public key belongs to a trusted source. Digital signature algorithms have
been developed to aid in the authentication of information. Key agreement protocols are
used to establish a key between two or more parties, allowing each party to participate in
generation of a common key. Key distribution protocols define distribution methods for
a trusted source to transmit key information to the relevant sources. Cryptanalysis of a
public-key system may also attempt to recover the private key, but additional information
may obtained through analysis of the public key which would aid in recovery of the private
key. Due to security of public-key systems being dependent on an underlying mathematical
problem, security can also be comprimised by researching faster, more efficient methods to
solve the underlying problem.
1.3.1 Classical public-key cryptosystems
A certain subset of public-key cryptosystems can be termed classical in the sense that they
are based on widely known and deeply studied hard problems. Public-key systems based
on the integer factorization problem, discrete logarithm problem or elliptic curve discrete
logarithm problem fall into this category. Integer factorization based systems rely on the
difficulty of factoring a large composite number into its prime factors. The RSA cryptosys-
tem, named after the initials of its authors, uses the integer factorization problem combined
with modular exponentiation to achieve encryption and decryption [5]. Cryptosystems
based on the discrete logarithm achieve security through the difficulty of finding an expo-
nent in a cyclic group to satisfy a chosen equation. More specifically, the discrete logarithm
4
problem can be defined by the following.
• Given a multiplicative group (G, ·) and an element α ∈ G of order n, define:
α〉 = {αi : 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1}, and let β ∈ 〈α〉
• Find the unique integer a such that:
αa = β and 0 ≤ a ≤ n− 1
• Alternatively, a = logα β
The ElGamal cryptosystem is based on the discrete logarithm problem, achieving secu-
rity through the difficulty of finding the unique exponent, the properties of the underlying
cyclic group and protection against semantic attacks [6]. The elliptic curve discrete loga-
rithm problem is similar to the discrete logarithm problem but uses scaling of a point on
an elliptic curve. The system space is defined by a finite field, an odd prime field or power
of two field, in which an elliptic curve is defined by the points in the field which satisfy a
chosen cubic equation. By choosing a point G, a cyclic group can be defined by the scalar
integer multiples of that point, (0, G,G + G,G + G + G, ...). By choosing a point G and
calculating the scalar multiplication result kG, the hard problem is to calculate k given
G and kG. Many variations of elliptic curve cryptosystems exist, the original suggestion
being posed independently by both Koblitz [7] and Miller [8].
1.4 Application of public-key cryptography
Although public-key cryptography is relevant in both wired and wireless applications, the
requirements are quite different. A general assumption that can be made for wired applica-
tion of cryptography is that the amount of security desired is the driving factor for the cryp-
tosystem. In this case, the cryptosystem is allowed to use any required resources for any
required amount of time, within practicality, to accomplish the desired security level. The
increasing number of applications which transmit confidential data over insecure channels
requires that public methods be made available for authentication and transmission of data
between sources. After contact is established, it is frequently preferred to use public-key
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cryptographic methods to communicate a private key for use by both parties in a symmet-
ric cryptosystem for the sake of efficiency. From a wired perspective, a public-key method
that approaches the efficiency of symmetric schemes may allow for communication using
public-key methods only.
In wireless applications, the desired level of security must be balanced with the amount
and availability of computational resources. Due to the lack of computational and mem-
ory resources, early assumptions were that private-key cryptography would be required.
Since a secure channel cannot be assumed to be available, alternative schemes have been
developed to implement private-key cryptosystems on an insecure channel, but they require
complex protocols to accomplish [9] and have been shown to be vulnerable to certain types
of attacks [10]. Public-key cryptosystems would seem to provide desired security services
as well as provide security advantages in the event that a node in a wireless network is
compromised [11]. Current trends seek to allow wireless computing in an embedded en-
vironment, requiring restriction of the amount of computational power, memory storage,
gate area and power that are allowed to be consumed by such devices. Existing public-
key schemes have been found to be challenging in terms of resource consumption (e.g., El
Gamal, RSA) or in terms of power scalability (e.g., ECC) [11].
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Chapter 2
NTRU background
2.1 NTRU Public-key Cryptosystem
The NTRU Public-Key Cryptosystem (PKCS) was developed due to the interest in compu-
tationally fast and efficient methods to implement public-key cryptography. The encryption
process is accomplished through polynomial ring arithmetic modulo two relatively prime
values (integer or polynomial). The decryption process reverses the encryption process us-
ing probabilistic methods with a chance of failure, although this is minimized or eliminated
through selection of the system parameters. The choice of system parameters, as with most
cryptosystems, is the main method for determining the projected level of security [12].
2.1.1 Convolution polynomial rings
The primary NTRU operations are performed on polynomials of degreeN − 1 with integer
coefficients in a convolution polynomial ring. The use of the term convolution polynomial
ring refers to symbolic reduction of the polynomials used in the system. Addition in the
polynomial ring is performed as with standard polynomials, coefficients of equal degree
are added together. Multiplication is also performed the same as with standard polynomial
except for the additional rule that XN ≡ 1. The result of this rule is that XN is replaced
by 1, XN+1 is replaced by X and so on. The general computation method is that the kth
coefficient ck is the dot product of the coefficients of a with the coefficients of b, where the
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coefficients of b are reversed and rotated k + 1 positions [12].
a+ b = (a0 + b0) + (a1 + b1)X + ...+ (aN−1 + bN−1)XN−1
a ∗ b = c0 + c1X + c2X2 + ...+ cN−2XN−2 + cN−1XN−1
ck = a0bk + a1bk−1 + ...+ akb0 + ak+1bN−1 + ak+2bN−2 + ...+ aN−1bk+1
Often, the notation used to represent that operations in the NTRU occur in a convolu-
tion polynomial ring is denoted as Z[X]/(XN − 1), where Z[X] represents a polynomial
with integer coefficients and the division (XN − 1) represents symbolic reduction of the
polynomial.
2.1.2 Basic parameters
The most basic parameters of the NTRU cryptosystem are N , p, and q. The parameter N
is used to define the degree of polynomials used in the convolution polynomial ring. The
modulus p is defined as the small modulus and the modulus q is the large modulus, where p
is much less than q. Most operations in the convolution ring will occur modulo q whereas
the modulus p is used to reduce the random generation components used in encryption and
to constrain the message space [12]. Modular reduction of a convolution polynomial is
performed by reducing each coefficient.
2.1.3 NTRU key generation
The key generation scheme is used to generate the private and public key pair. The process
begins by choosing two small polynomials f and g, where small is defined as having coef-
ficients much smaller than the large modulus q. The inverse of f is calculated both modulo
p and modulo q, generating fp ∗ f ≡ 1 (mod p) and fq ∗ f ≡ 1 (mod q). The values f
and fp are retained as the private key pair and the public key h is calculated using p, fq and
g [12].
h ≡ pfq ∗ g (mod q)
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2.1.4 NTRU encryption
The encryption process starts by generating a polynomial messagemwhose coefficients lie
in an interval of length p, which is normally centered around zero. A small random blinding
polynomial, r, is then generated and used to obscure the message. The final encryption uses
m, r and the public key h to generate e, the encrypted message [12].
e ≡ r ∗ h+m (mod q)
2.1.5 NTRU decryption
The decryption process first uses the private key f to calculate:
a ≡ f ∗ e (mod q)
The coefficients of a must be chosen in the proper interval of length q to ensure the highest
probability that the decryption process will be successful. Once the coefficients of a are
chosen on the proper interval, a is reduced modulo p and the second private key is used to
compute:
b ≡ a (mod p)
c ≡ fp ∗ b (mod p)
If decryption has successfully completed, then the polynomial c will be equal to m, the
original message [12].
2.1.5.1 Why decryption works
To understand the decryption process, an understanding of the reason behind the decryption
steps must first be reached. During the encryption process, polynomials modulo the smaller
modulus p are combined to form polynomials modulo the larger modulus q. In this case,
the results of reduction are not as critical because the smaller modulus space is contained
within the larger modulus space. During decryption, the process of encryption is reversed,
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meaning the polynomials are being constrained from the larger modulus space back to the
smaller modulus space. The operations must be examined carefully because a reduction
in the larger modulus space can cause a change in the residue class of the reduction using
the smaller modulus, which would cause the recovered message to differ from the original
message. In order to get a better idea of the problem that can occur, an example below
is provided using the product of 34, 5 and 7 reduced both modulo 37 and modulo 3 in a
number of cases.
• Case 1: Reduction of 1190 using the modulus 3
1190 ≡ 2 (mod 3)
• Case 2: Reduction of 1190 using the modulus 37
1190 ≡ 6 (mod 37)
• Case 3: Reduction of 1190 using the modulus 37 followed by reduction using the
modulus 3
1190 ≡ 6 (mod 37)
6 ≡ 0 (mod 3)
From comparison of the first case and the third case, an example can be seen where
the result of reduction in a larger modulus can change the result of reduction in a smaller
modulus. A possible solution for this issue is to eliminate a factor in the product to reduce
result of the product to be less than the larger modulus. In the example provided, if the
factor 34 were eliminated, then the product would be 35 and reduction modulo the larger
modulus 37 would have no effect. The decryption process for NTRU uses this concept,
except that the operations occur on polynomials with integer coefficients.
Decryption makes use of the public key h, the private key pair f and fp, and the en-
crypted message e. The encrypted message is the sum of the original message and scaled
version of the public key, e ≡ r ∗ h + m (mod q). Out of the parameters, the receiver
only has the value of h and therefore has to use mathematical methods to retrieve the mes-
sage. To get a better idea of what the encrypted message is equivalent to, a substitution for
the public key can be made, h ≡ pfq ∗ g (mod q). The result allows for analysis of the
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components of the encrypted message, e ≡ r ∗ (pfq ∗ g) +m (mod q). The polynomials
r, g and m and modulus p are all comparatively small to the modulus q. To eliminate the
large factor, fq, the encrypted message can be multiplied by the private key f . Note that all
calculations are performed within the convolutional polynomial ring, an implicit reduction
modulo XN − 1 occurs before reduction modulo either p or q.
e ≡ r ∗ h+m (mod q)
substitute h ≡ pfq ∗ g (mod q)
e ≡ r ∗ (pfq ∗ g) +m (mod q)
multiply by the private key f
a ≡ f ∗ e ≡ f ∗ (r ∗ pfq ∗ g) + f ∗m (mod q)
since f ∗ fq ≡ 1 (mod q), the result is
a ≡ f ∗ e ≡ pr ∗ g + f ∗m (mod q)
The private key f is small compared to the modulus q as well, so the result a is com-
prised of polynomials and a scalar which are all comparatively small to q. With the removal
of fq and the proper choice of system parameters, the value of a should be unchanged
whether it is modulo q or not. The consequence of this is that not only is a ≡ pr ∗g+f ∗m
(mod q) but more importantly a = pr∗g+f ∗m. To finish retrieving the original message,
the result a is reduced modulo p and multiplied the second private key fp.
a ≡ pr ∗ g + f ∗m (mod q)
reduce modulo p
b ≡ pr ∗ g + f ∗m (mod p)
the quantity pr ∗ g is reduced to zero
b ≡ f ∗m (mod p)
multiply the private key fp
c ≡ fp ∗ b ≡ fp ∗ f ∗m (mod p)
since f ∗ fp ≡ 1 (mod p), the result is
c ≡ m (mod p)
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The original message was constructed modulo p, so c is exactly equal to the original mes-
sagem assuming all of the operations were successful.
2.2 Standards
NTRU Cryptosystems, Inc. has set out to define standard interfaces to provide definitions
on secure and efficient ways to implement an NTRU system. Although NTRU Cryptosys-
tems is active in numerous bodies, the two most frequently referenced are the Institute of
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) and the Consortium for Efficient Embedded
Security (CEES). Collaboration with the CEES has generated the Efficient Embedded Se-
curity Standard #1 (EESS) [13]. Current work with the IEEE has generated the 1363.1
draft standard [14], a work that is still in progress.
To compare the EESS and IEEE 1363.1 documents is inappropriate because the scope
differs between the two. The EESS document seeks to provide a standard implementa-
tion interface for the NTRU system in wired and wireless applications. The EESS is also
targeted more towards applications using a microcontroller and so limits the scope of the
parameters recommended. The IEEE 1363.1 document is more of a reference for tech-
niques, theoretic background and security considerations. Due to the difference, the EESS
document contains much more material on interface definitions but references the IEEE
1363.1 document for detailed discussion of security. Perhaps due to still being a draft revi-
sion, the IEEE 1363.1 document lacks the detailed information on NTRUSign, a signature
scheme based on the NTRU operations, which can be found in the EESS document. Despite
these differences, the similarities between the two standards are apparent when analyzing
the recommended primitives and procedures.
Although the EESS document was taken into consideration during the course of this
thesis, the focus was shifted toward the IEEE 1363.1 draft standard because of recent pub-
lications. In consideration of future editing to the 1363.1 draft standard, a currently studied
attack [15] and the resulting changes caused in the recommended parameter sets [16] was
12
considered.
2.2.1 IEEE 1363.1
The IEEE 1363.1 Draft Standard for Public-Key Cryptographic Techniques Based on Hard
Problems over Lattices is part of the IEEE 1363 series of documents meant to provide
a central reference for public-key techniques. The 1363-2000 [17] and 1363a-2004 [18]
documents provide information for public-key schemes based on the integer factorization,
discrete logarithm and elliptic curve discrete logarithm problems. In addition to 1363.1,
there is also work being done on IEEE 1363.2 Password-Based Public-Key Cryptography
[19] and IEEE 1363.3 Identity-Based Public-Key Cryptography [20].
2.2.1.1 Supporting algorithms
In order to support the functions of key generation, encryption and decryption certain func-
tionality must be provided. IEEE 1363.1 defines a mask generation function (MGF), index
generation function (IGF) and a blinding polynomial generation method (BPGM) which
are based on an underlying hash function.
A hash function is used to take a set of bytes (which must not exceed a predefined max-
imum) and reduce it to a fixed length hash code. A typical use of a hash function is to hash
the data being sent to another party and include the hash code with the original message in
the encryption process. The party decrypting the message uses the same hash function on
the message they decrypt and compares it to the hash code sent with the message to help
verify that the correct message has been received. In order for this to be a valid method
of verification, the hash function should have a low chance of collisions, two input strings
resulting in the same hash code, to obtain the highest chance of detecting any change in
the message data during transmission. The currently supported hash functions are the SHA
hash functions as defined in FIPS 180-2 [21]. The recommended practice is that for k bits
of security, a hash function with k or greater output bits should be used.
A mask generation function is used to ensure a reasonably random distribution of bits
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after encryption and to ensure that a single bit of the output is dependent on multiple input
bits. From a security standpoint, the encrypted text will require a larger search space to
discover and should be less vulnerable to attack if it has been sufficiently randomized.
Verification using the MGF output is accomplished during decryption by comparing the
MGF output of the recovered message with the MGF value obtained from the encrypted
message, the transmission is discarded if the two MGF values differ. Due to one output
bit of the MGF being dependent on multiple input bits, this assures with relatively high
confidence that the message has not been corrupted during transmission. TheMGF function
is described in the IEEE 1363.1 document, but can also be found in the IEEE 1363-2000
standard.
In order to provide protection against chosen ciphertext attacks, a blinding polynomial
is used during the encryption process whose generation is based on the message being
encrypted. An index generation function, similar to the MGF except that it is state aware
and can therefore be called multiple times, is used to provide a source of reasonably random
indices. To decrease the chance of bias in the output indices from the IGF, the output
is constrained to a range that is as close to a multiple of N as possible. The blinding
polynomial generation method uses the output indices from the index generation function
to create the blinding polynomial. Both the IGF and BPGM are defined in the IEEE 1363.1
document.
2.2.1.2 Optimizations
In addition to the recommended supporting algorithms, there are also recommended prac-
tices to efficiently implement the NTRU system. Some of the recommended efficiency
improvements are general system optimizations and others are specific to certain choices
of parameters.
During the final step of the decryption process, the inverse of the private key modulo
the small modulus p is multiplied by the candidate value to obtain the candidate plain text.
One of the optimizations used is to choose the form of the private key to be f = 1+ p ∗ F ,
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where F is a random polynomial with dF non-zero coefficients. By choosing the private
key in this form, the inverse modulo p of the private key is simply one which eliminates
the need for the final convolution multiplication during decryption. Additional savings are
achieved in terms of storage and key generation computations, as the inverse of the private
key modulo p does not need to be stored or computed.
To obtain greater efficiency during multiplication operations, an alternative form is sug-
gested that takes advantage of sparse polynomials. The suggested form, f = f1 ∗f2+f3, is
constructed from polynomials f1, f2, and f3 having df1 , df2 and df3 non-zero coefficients,
respectively. Multiplying these separate vectors, the entire multiplication by f would re-
quire (df1 + df2 + df3)N operations instead of (df )N operations per coefficient. For exam-
ple, with N = 251 and df = 90, one might choose df1 = df2 = df3 = 9. A multiplication
of a polynomial a by f would require (df )N = 22590 operations per coefficient. Using the
alternative representation, the result could be calculated in three steps by a∗f1, (a∗f1)∗f2
and a ∗ f3, leading to (df1 + df2 + df3)N = 6777 operations per coefficient.
Operating under the assumption that construction of message using a binary small mod-
ulus would be appealing, an algorithm is provided for efficient multiplication of a binary
polynomial with a large modulus reduced polynomial. The algorithm takes advantage of
representing the binary polynomial by a vector of positions of the non-zero elements. While
such an approach might be applicable to a larger modulus, the efficiency of storing the posi-
tions of non-zero elements would be reduced with the need to store what value the non-zero
elements were.
2.2.1.3 Security levels and parameter selection
In order to determine the security level of a specific parameter set, work has been done
to develop methods to estimate the bit security. For in depth discussion of the estimation
procedure for determining the bit security levels used by NTRU, [22] and [23] can be
referenced. More recent work has been focused at developing an algorithm to generate a
complete parameter set based on the desired final bit security. Description of the algorithm
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can be found in [14] and [23]. While the main outlined algorithm seeks to generate as low
a value for N as possible to keep the final polynomial sizes small, [23] also presents an
alternative approach which fixes the value for q and adjusts N as necessary to obtain the
desired security level. The flexibility of this approach allows for implementation of the
NTRU not only in larger, performance oriented systems but also in systems which have a
hard constraint on the size of integer operands which are allowed.
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Chapter 3
NTRU investigation
3.1 Previous work
Although the NTRU algorithm has been scrutinized and peer reviewed by numerous parties,
there have not been many widely published implementations in hardware. NTRU Cryp-
tosystems, Inc. has made public some of their own hardware design work [24], while other
significant sources include work peformed by Colleen O’Rourke [25] and Jens-Peter Kaps
[11] from the Worcester Polytechnic Institute. The most recent source of interest found
was a software implementation, performed by Johannes Buchmann et al. at the Technis-
che Universita¨t Darmstadt, that provided a possible increase in efficiency for polynomial
multiplication [26].
Work presented in [24] describes the NTRU Embedded Reference Implementation
(NERI) toolkit, a multi-platform ANSI C based software package. In addition an FPGA
implementation is discussed, although the details are rather limited. More recent packages
in C, Java and VHDL work can be purchased at the NTRU website, obviously outside
the scope of this work. A significant value provided by the NTRU website is the open
disclosure of technical notes and articles.
The work established in [25] demonstrates a scalable architecture to perform NTRU
polynomial multiplications and a unified architecture that uses Montgomery multiplication
[27] to provide support for NTRU and other cryptographic schemes. Although the architec-
ture presented is relevant in terms of flexibility, better results can now be achieved through
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choice of parameters and optimizations that eliminate the need for explicit standard integer
multiplication during a polynomial convolution multiplication.
In [11] a scalable ultra low power design is introduced for NTRU polynomial multi-
plications. The architecture makes use of a circular shift register to rotate the coefficients
of one of the polynomial operands during a convolution multiplication. The buffer may
be tapped at multiple points to execute concurrent multiplication of coefficients for higher
performance or at a single point to reduce power consumption. Due to the focus of the
work, it targets a very specific set of conditions in order to make conclusions concerning
ultra-low application of NTRU encryption.
A software approach to optimizing the convolution multiplication operation is presented
in [26]. The work focuses on the case where a polynomial convolution multiplication
occurs between a polynomial with binary coefficients and another general polynomial. By
seeking patterns in the binary operand, one calculation could be made to help compute
multiple partial results. Although this method was found to provide better results, the
choice of using binary polynomials is no longer recommended [16].
3.2 NTRU design and modeling
Although hardware aspects have been considered in previously published works [25] [11]
[24], there has been no known publication of an in depth study of the NTRU system regard-
ing implementation in hardware. With the goal of introducing many of the hardware related
design issues, the general system will be examined, followed by specific considerations for
design and modeling based on the IEEE 1363.1 draft standard. While only the aspects
for design are presented here, the following chapter will provide in depth discussion and
analysis.
18
3.2.1 Design considerations for a general NTRU system
For implementation of almost any system, it is often advisable to consider the primary
operands and operations that are involved in the system. For the NTRU system, the primary
operands are convolution polynomials or their integer coefficients. Operations to consider
are addition, multiplication and inversion of convolution polynomials and modular reduc-
tion and inversion of coefficients. Although these factors can be evaluated independently
of the specific parameters used in the system, often it is more valuable to assess particular
groups of parameters.
Depending on the choice of parameters, the length of a polynomial used in the NTRU
system can range from around three thousand bits to well into the tens of thousands of bits.
Although one of these polynomials may seem to fit trivially in the amount of memory that
is commonly available to hardware systems, several polynomials are used in the system and
the total amount of memory needed may be unachievable for some systems. In addition,
access patterns should be taken into account when deciding on the method of operating on
the polynomials, which is often dependent on the type of storage used. At times it may
be better to pack coefficients in the minimum space required but there are also situations
where it may be better to have padding between coefficients. Some hardware configura-
tions may not support arithmetic on operands above a certain bit length or may be less
efficient when operating on bit lengths that are between standard operand boundaries. For
example, consider a configurable piece of hardware which has embedded multiplier units
accepting 16 bit operands. If the system parameters allow for a minimum coefficients size
of 10 bits, then an implementation using only 10 bits might create an implementation using
configurable logic or lookup table version of a 10 bit multiplier in order to keep the more
efficient embedded resources available. If the option is available, it is possible to force
the operation onto the embedded resource anyway, but it would also be possible to pad the
coefficients out to 16 bits to cause a migration into the embedded resource. Additional de-
tails concerning storage methods and memory requirements can be found in the following
chapter.
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Following almost every operation in the NTRU system, the result is reduced either
modulo p or q. The modular reduction of a polynomial being defined by reducing each
coefficient, there areN reductions per operation. Assuming that a general modulus is used,
a general reduction algorithm would have to be used, but often the form of the chosen
moduli allows for better performance. In hardware, power of two reductions are performed
at no cost by truncating the result of an operation or can be performed at minimal cost
using a masking operation. Optimizations can also be made to perform faster reduction
of certain classes of moduli, such as Mersenne primes which are of the form p = 2x − 1.
An example of a fast algorithm for reduction of Mersenne primes is shown in Algorithm
3.1. Modular inversion of integers is used during key generation in the NTRU system
Algorithm 3.1Modular reduction using Mersenne primes
Input: an integer a, a Mersenne prime p
Output: b ≡ a (mod p)
Step 1: b = a
Step 2: do while b > p
Step 3: split b into sections ci|ci−1|...|c1|c0
each of length log2(p+ 1) bits
Step 4: b = ci + ci−1 + ...+ c1 + c0
depending on the choice of inversion used for polynomials. Polynomial inversion using
the Extended Euclidean Algorithm requires an integer modular inversion per iteration and
one final inversion to calculate the result. For smaller moduli, the inverse can often be
easily stored in a lookup table, but the Extended Euclidean Algorithm can also be used for
large moduli. In order to calculate the inverse modulo the power of a prime, an algorithm
based on Newton’s iteration is presented in [28] and is repeated here, for convenience, in
Algorithm 3.2. Although the algorithm is presented for convolution polynomials, the same
method is applicable to integers as well.
The convolution polynomial addition operation is the same as normal polynomials in
that each coefficient of similar degree is added together. Due to the simplistic nature of
the calculation, about the only variable in the process is whether each coefficient is done
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Algorithm 3.2 Inversion in (Z/prZ)[X]/(XN − 1) [28]
Input: a(X), p (a prime), r (the exponent for p)
b(X) ≡ a(X)−1 (mod p)
Output: b(X) ≡ a(X)−1 (mod pr)
Step 1: q = p
Step 2: do while q < pr
Step 3: q = q2
Step 4: b(X) := b(X)(2− a(X)b(X)) (mod q)
individually or whether multiple coefficients of the addition output are calculated simulta-
neously. The convolution polynomial multiplication operation is far more challenging to
efficiently implement and is one of the most researched aspects of the NTRU system. The
most obvious manner of calculating the result is to calculate each output coefficient sep-
arately by cycling through the N long coefficient vectors. The entire calculation requires
iteration through two nested loops and approximately N2 multiplications and additions. In
addition to the methods used in [11] and [26], [29] and [30] present methods for achieving
better results for convolution polynomial multiplication. [29] presents a recursive method
for splitting the operands of a convolution multiplication until their degree goes below a
threshold d. By splitting the operands, partial multiplication results can be reused leading
to an overall reduction of the computational work needed to produce the result. The method
for improving the efficiency of the multiplication operation presented in [30] is the same
optimization presented for [14] which uses operands of a special form. Further analysis of
the multiplication operation is provided in the next chapter.
A set of algorithms based on the Extended Euclidean Algorithm is presented in [14] and
a set algorithms based on the Almost Inverse Algorithm is presented in [28] for inversion
of convolution polynomials. The Extended Euclidean Algorithm is divided into a wrapper
function, a call to the Extended Euclidean Algorithm and a polynomial division algorithm
in [14]. All of these have been combined to be presented in Algorithm 3.3. The arbitrary
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Algorithm 3.3 Extended Euclidean Algorithm - Inversion in Z/pZ)[X]/(XN − 1) [14]
Input: A prime p, a positive integer N and
a polynomial a in Zp[X]/(XN − 1)
Output: A polynomial b satifying a∗b = 1 in Zp[X]/(XN−1) if
a is invertible in Zp[X]/(XN − 1), otherwise FALSE
Step 1: Set b := XN − 1
Step 2: Set u := 1
Step 3: Set d := a
Step 4: Set v1 := 0
Step 5: Set v3 := b
Step 6: do while v3 6= 0
Step 7: Set t3 := d and q := 0
Step 8: Set uN := v
−1
3N
(mod p)
Step 9: do while deg(t3) ≥ N
Step 10: Set dt3 := deg(t3)
Step 11: Set v := uN ∗ t3dt3 ∗X(dt3−N)
Step 12: Set t3 := t3 − v ∗ v3
Step 13: Set q := q + v
Step 14: Set t1 := u− q ∗ v1
Step 15: Set u := v1
Step 16: Set d := v3
Step 17: Set v1 := t1
Step 18: Set v3 := t3
Step 19: If deg(d) = 0
Step 20: Return b = d−1 (mod p) ∗ u (mod XN − 1)
Step 21: Else return FALSE
prime version of the Almost Inverse Algorithm provided by [28] is provided in Algorithm
3.4, along with specific versions for p = 2 and p = 3 as well. For inversion of convolution
polynomials modulo the power of a prime, Algorithm 3.2 must be used as an additional
step. While it is difficult to immediately choose which is preferable from examination of
the algorithms, further analysis of the Extended Euclidean and Almost Inverse Algorithms
for convolution polynomial inversion is presented in the next chapter.
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Algorithm 3.4 Almost Inverse Algorithm - Inversion in Z/pZ)[X]/(XN − 1) [28]
Input: a(X), p (a prime)
Output: b(X) ≡ a(X)−1 in (Z/pZ)[X]/(XN − 1)
Step 1: Initialization: k := 0, b(X) := 1, c(X) := 0,
f(X) := a(X), g(X) := XN − 1
Step 2: Loop:
Step 3: do while f0 = 0
Step 4: f(X) := f(X)/X, c(X) := c(X) ∗X, k := k + 1
Step 5: if deg(f) = 0 then
Step 6: b(X) := f−10 b(X) (mod p)
Step 7: return XN−kb(X) (mod XN − 1)
Step 8: if deg(f) < deg(g) then
Step 9: exchange f and g and exchange b and c
Step 10: u := f0g
−1
0 (mod p)
Step 11: f(X) := f(X)− u ∗ g(X) (mod p)
Step 12: b(X) := b(X)− u ∗ c(X) (mod p)
Step 13: goto Loop
3.2.2 Detailed aspects of IEEE 1363.1
Although many sources provide a basic description of the NTRU system, as is the case
with many cryptosystems, additional steps should be taken to protect the system from cer-
tain types of attacks. The IEEE 1363.1 draft standard support functions, as described in
2.2.1.1, are provided in detail in this section along with descriptions of the encryption and
decryption processes.
To start the discussion of the NTRU system as presented in IEEE 1363.1, an overview
of the system parameters is needed. In addition to the basic parameters N , p and q, each
sample parameter set also defines certain values in relation to key generation, the formation
of the message data, the type of Mask Generation Function (MGF) to use, the type of
Blinding Polynomial Generation Method (BPGM) to use, and parameters related to the
balancing of the encryption and decryption processes. An example parameter set for N =
347, set 2, is provided in Table 3.1.
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N = 347 (1)
p = 2 (2)
q = 269 (3)
Key generation: LBP-KGP-1 with
dF = 66 (4)
dg = 173 (5)
lLen = 1 (6)
db = 112 (7)
dm0 = 108 (8)
MGF1 with
SHA-1 (MGF)
LBP-BPGM1 with
IGF-MGF1 with SHA-1 (IGF)
dr = 66 (9)
c = 14 (10)
oLenMin = 300 (11)
OID = 00 02 02 (12)
pkLen = 0 (13)
A = 0 (14)
Table 3.1: Parameter set for ees347ep2
There are two methods specified for key generation in IEEE 1363.1, one uses the full
polynomial forms and the other uses product forms as described in 2.2.1.2. In the case
that product forms are not used, as referenced in Table 3.1 and shown in Algorithm 3.5,
only the polynomials F and g need to be defined for generation of the private and public
keys. Recall that the private key is of the form f = 1 + p ∗ F and the public key is formed
by h ≡ pfq ∗ g (mod q). For use in random generation, dF [Table 3.1.4] and dg [Table
3.1.5] define the number of non-zero coefficients that are needed in the polynomials F
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and g respectively. In the case that products forms were used, F would be of the form
F = f1 ∗ f2 + f3 and so a quantity dfi would be specified for the number of non-zero
coefficients in each polynomial fi.
Algorithm 3.5 Random key generation primitive, LBP-KGP1 (Algorithm 22 in [14])
The first part (steps a through f shown in Figure 3.6) of the encryption process is to
form the message construct M = b ‖ octL ‖ m ‖ p0. The message data m is an input to
the encryption function along with l, the length of the messagem in bytes. The lLen [Table
3.1.6] parameter defines the number of bytes that should be used to encode the value of l,
which is stored into octL for use in constructingM . The quantity db [Table 3.1.7] describes
the number of bits that should be in the randomly generated bit string b used in M . The
last part of the message construct, p0, is a zero pad used to pad M out to nLen = dN/8e
bytes, the number of bytes needed to hold N bits.
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The second part (steps g through o shown in Algorithm 3.6) of the encryption process
forms the final data used in encryption, an XORing of the message construct M and a
blinding value. Similar to key generation, there are two methods specified for generation
of the blinding value depending on whether product forms are used or not. In Table 3.1,
LBP-BPGM1 refers to the blinding polynomial generation method (BPGM) which does not
use product forms. Furthermore, IGF-MGF1 is defined as the underlying index generation
function (IGF) for the BPGM and SHA-1 is defined as the underlying hash function for the
IGF. For reference, the functional diagram representing the flow of variables used during
the encryption process is provided in Figure 3.1.
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Algorithm 3.6 Encryption Operation (Algorithm 26 in [14])
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Algorithm 3.7 Encryption Operation - continued (Algorithm 26 in [14])
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Figure 3.1: Functional diagram of the encryption operation [14]
The index generation function (IGF), shown in Algorithm 3.8, uses an input seed and
a counter to run a hash algorithm multiple times in order to generate pseudo-random in-
dex data. The index data is used by the blinding polynomial generation method (BPGM),
shown in Algorithm 3.10, to create the non-zero coefficients of the blinding polynomial
r. The seed for the IGF, sData = OID ‖ m ‖ b ‖ hTrunc, is constructed from the
message data m, the random bit padding b, an identifier for the parameter set OID [Ta-
ble 3.1.12] and hTrunc, the first pkLen [Table 3.1.13] bits of the public key. In order
to prevent timing based attacks based on the number of calls to the hash function during
the generation of the blinding polynomial, as described in [31], the parameter oLenMin
is provided as the minimum number of output bytes that should be generated by the IGF.
The IGF takes as an input the minimum number of calls that should be made to the under-
lying hash function, minCalls, which can be calculated use the oLenMin [Table 3.1.11]
parameter and the number of bytes of output that the underlying hash generates, hLen,
by minCalls = oLenMin/hLen. In the parameter set shown in Table 3.1, the value of
hLen would be 20 and so minCalls = 15. The IGF consumes the stored buffer of hash
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values oLen bytes at a time, however oLen is not defined in the parameter sets but can be
experimentally determined if sample data is provided. The indices output from the IGF are
taken from the leading NLen = d(log2N)/8e bytes of the oLen bytes consumed during
each call. To restrict the range of the index generation output, only the trailing c [Table
3.1.10] bits of the NLen bytes are used. The BPGM creates a polynomial with all zero
coefficients to start with, repeatedly calling the IGF to receive an index to check in the
polynomial. If the coefficient is non-zero, then the index is discarded and the IGF is called
again, but otherwise the coefficient is set and the number of non-zero coefficients left to
assign is decreased by one. The end result is the blinding polynomial r, which will have dr
[Table 3.1.9] non-zero coefficients.
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Algorithm 3.8 Index generation function (Algorithm 19 in [14])
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Algorithm 3.9 Index generation function - continued (Algorithm 19 in [14])
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Algorithm 3.10 Blinding polynomial generation method (Algorithm 20 in [14])
Once the blinding polynomial, r, has been generated, it is multiplied by the public key
to form R = r ∗ h (mod q). To calculate the mask, R is taken modulo two and input
into the mask generation function (MGF). The MGF, shown in Algorithm 3.11, calculates
the hash of the input concatenated with a 32-bit counter for cThreshold = doLen/hLene
iterations to fill a buffer of size cThreshold ∗ hLen bytes, where oLen can be considered
to be nLen = dN/8e. The result of the MGF is XOR’ed with the message contruct M to
form the message representative, m′. After zeroing out the difference between N and the
number of bytes that N fits into, nLen, the message representative is checked to see that
it has between dm0 [Table 3.1.8] and N − dm0 non-zero bits to ensure that it is decently
balanced in the number of zero and non-zero bits. The final encrypted value, e ≡ R + i
(mod q), is calculated by converting the message representative into a polynomial, i, and
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adding it to the value of the blinding polynomial multiplied by the public key.
Algorithm 3.11Mask generation function (Algorithm 18 in [14])
The decryption operation, shown in Algorithm 3.12, reverses the encryption operation
using the decryption primitive, shown in Figure 3.14. The decryption primitive uses the
parameter A [Table 3.1.14] to decrypt the coefficients of the message representative in the
proper range and is called by the decryption operation algorithm. The decryption operation
retrieves the candidate message representative, ci, from the decryption primitive and uses
it to calculate the candidate value for the product of the blinding value and the public key,
cR = e − ci. The candidate message construct, cM , is retrieved by running cR through
the MGF function and XORing the result with ci (XORing a quantity by the same value
twice is equivalent to XORing the quantity by all zeroes, which does not change the data).
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The candidate bit padding, cb, and candidate message data are used along with the OID to
generate a candidate blinding polynomial cr. The candidate blinding value is multiplied by
the public key, to form cR′, which is then checked against cR. If the two values match, then
the decryption operation is successful. For reference, the functional diagram representing
the flow of variables used during the decryption process is provided in Figure 3.2.
Figure 3.2: Functional diagram of the decryption operation
3.2.3 VHDL modeling of an IEEE 1363.1 system
To investigate the aspects of the NTRU system, a hybrid behavioral and structural VHDL
model was designed. Components that were easily translatable to hardware were imple-
mented using structural models, while some of the more complex components were writ-
ten using behavioral style code. Two main goals were used during the design and creation
of the IEEE 1363.1 system model. The first goal was to make the system as modular as
possible to facilitate the changing of individual models without need for recreation of the
full system model. Due to the draft status of the IEEE 1363.1 standard, it is likely that
future edits could change the recommended practices, which is reflected in the separation
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Algorithm 3.12 Decryption operation (Algorithm 27 in [14])
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Algorithm 3.13 Decryption operation - continued (Algorithm 27 in [14])
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Algorithm 3.14 Decryption primitive (Algorithm 24 in [14])
of the system into fairly small functional blocks. Each of the functional blocks making a
sensible division, the models are mainly separated around the boundaries of the algorithms
presented in the standard, as shown in Figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3: Interaction of IEEE 1363.1 system components
38
The second goal was to make the system flexible with regard to changing of the top-
level system parameters. Although the system could have been created in a manner similar
to the algorithm blocks defined in the IEEE 1363.1 draft standard, the choice was instead
made to use generic declarations to control each model. Use of generics in each model
allowed the system testbench to control the parameters used in testing without modification
of each individual model but also allowed for a reduced number of inputs and outputs
compared to that needed for a dynamically changing system. The full models for key
generation, encryption and decryption were wrapped in a testbench which provided inputs
based on available testing data and checked for the expected outputs. The final model
became a testing platform for all of the pieces of the IEEE 1363.1 draft standard with
ability to be piece-wise adapted for further study and optimization. Figure 3.4 shows the
IEEE 1363.1 components with reference to the VHDL models created from them and the
testing loop used to verify the final incorporated models.
Figure 3.4: Design flow for creation and testing of VHDL models
In order to facilitate the convolution multiplications of a general system, a model was
created to handle all of the cases that might need to be handled. The model, shown in Fig-
ure 3.5, accepts two polynomials modulo p, two polynomials modulo q or a combination of
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the both. In addition, the output polynomial can be reduced modulo an integer input, modn,
to allow for special cases and also allows a scaling of the output polynomial, through use
of the integer input scale, before reduction for calculations such as the public key where
the output needs to be scaled by p. The type of input used and whether or not the output
is scaled is controlled by the input datyp. The calculation that performs the convolution
multiplication is the basic algorithm, taking N2 operations, where each operation is a mul-
tiplication and an addition. The calculation is initiated by a rising edge on the daclk and is
calculated immediately due to the behavioral nature of the model. In addition to the modulo
p and modulo q outputs, there is a modulo two output used for directly inputting into the
mask generation function after the calculation of R = r ∗ h (mod q). The generic values
cl2q and cl2p are used throughout the system and represent the number of bits that should
be used to store each coefficient in q and p respectively.
Figure 3.5: Block diagram for basic, general convolution multiplication
The underlying building block for the mask generation function and index generation
function is a hash function. Under the current draft standard of IEEE 1363.1, the Secure
Hash Algorithm (SHA) family of hashes are used as specified in [21]. Due to the volume
of research that has been conducted on the SHA family of hashes, a minimum level of
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effort was placed in generating versions of the specific SHA hashes used in testing. A
VHDL procedure was constructed for each version of SHA needed, an example of which
is shown in Figure 3.6. The diagram shows the internal usage of the procedure to calculate
the hash along with a wrapper model to allow for control of the inputs and output of the
hash, although this is merged with the inputs and outputs of the functional blocks that the
procedure is included in. Upon a rising edge transition on the daclk input, the current 512-
bit block of the input message of msize is processed and output to hashv. Subsequent rising
edges on the daclk will continue to cause processing on themblock input using the previous
hash values until either a reset occurs or the full number of bits in the message have been
processed. Although the choice of using a procedure caused the hash implementation to
generate one MGF and one IGF model for each SHA version, the impact was minimal and
the model could be easily adapted to a new hash procedure or modified to calculate the
hash in a separate model. The decision on which hash function to used is determined by
the security level, k, desired. The recommendation is to choose a hash function with output
length greater than or equal to k, although the recommended parameters for security level
k = 160 use SHA-256 instead of SHA-1. Although this research was conducted using the
recommended SHA functions, it should be noted that the National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) is currently accepting submissions for a new hash algorithm to
augment the FIPS 180-2 Secure Hash Standard. The new algorithm, dubbed ”SHA-3”,
will seek to provide better security compared to the previous SHA functions, in light of
advancements in the cryptanalysis of hash functions [32].
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Figure 3.6: Block diagram for SHA1
The mask generation function (MGF) model, shown in Figure 3.7, is mainly a wrapper
for either the SHA-1 or SHA-256 procedure, so that the hash can be called multiple times.
Since the input to the MGF is known to be R2 ≡ r ∗ h (mod 2), the zblock input is known
to be nLen = dN/8e bytes. The number of input blocks, numblk, is calculated to be the
number of hash input block needed to fit nLen + 32 bits, where the additional 32 bits are
needed for a counter. If the output of the hash function is long enough to produce nLen
bytes of output, then only one iteration is executed, otherwise the counter is incremented
and the hash function is called again. The hash output of each consecutive iteration is
concatenated together until enough data has been buffered that it can be XOR’ed with the
entire message construct. The value of oLen is the number of hash output blocks that are
needed for the masking operation.
Figure 3.7: Block diagram for MGF1
The index generation function model, shown in Figure 3.8, also wraps around either
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the SHA-1 or SHA-256 procedure, but adds extra functionality to maintain status for sub-
sequent calls and to control the output integer value on each call. The input zblock is the
seed data sData = OID ‖ m ‖ b ‖ hTrunc, which is of a known maximum length. Since
all of the sample parameter sets use pkLen = 0, zero bytes of the public key are used in the
seed data, so it was not considered in the calculation for the maximum length of the seed
data. Although the input zblock is expanded based on the maximum message size, the input
octL is used during the calculation of the hash to determine how many bytes of message
data are actually present. The parameter numblk is used in a similar fashion to the mask
generation function, it is used to create a buffer that will fit the maximum length input data
for input into the hash algorithm. Due to a conflict with the variable named used in SHA,
the system parameter c is redefined as IGFc in the index generation function.
Figure 3.8: Block diagram for IGF1
The blinding polynomial generation method (BPGM) model, shown in Figure 3.9, is
implemented as a simple state machine used to generate the blinding polynomial r. The
state machine enters an active state upon a high input on the strtgen, at which point it
clocks the daclk input to the index generation function to receive a pseudo-random index.
The index received is checked in the polynomial r and set if the coefficient is not already
non-zero. If a coefficient can successfully set, the remaining count of coefficients that need
to be set is decremented by one until the full dr coefficients have been assigned. Once the
full number of coefficients have been assigned, the gendone signal is set high and the output
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polynomial data is held valid until the strtgen signal is set low. If the strtgen signal is set
low before the state machine reaches the output holding state, then the output polynomial
will be held valid for only one clock cycle.
Figure 3.9: Block diagram for BPGM1
The key generation primitive (KGP) model, shown in Figure 3.10, interfaces with the
convolution multiplication model and the inverse polynomial model to generate the private
and public keys. The KGP is implemented as a state machine which is activated and de-
activated in a similar manner to the blinding polynomial generation method state machine.
The KGP accepts as input the random polynomials F and g, which were obtained from
available test data. The state machine starts by calculating the private, f = 1 + p ∗ F .
The inverse polynomial model is then used and the output is checked to make sure that the
inverse of the private key exists modulo q. If the inverse does not exist, the state machine
returns to loading the input value for the polynomial F and starts the calculation of the pri-
vate key and its inverse again. If the inverse of the private key does exist, the state machine
loads the value of the random polynomial g and calculates the inverse modulo q. Although
it is not necessary for g to be invertible, the calculation of security used in the IEEE 1363.1
draft standard requires that the public key be invertible modulo q, which in turn requires
each of its components to be invertible modulo q. In the same manner as with F , if the
inverse of g does not exist, the state machine reloads the value of g and recalculates the
inverse. The consequence of implementing the KGP this way is that the testbench which
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operates the KGP must respond to the invalid inverse signals to ensure that new random
polynomials are input in case of an inversion failure, otherwise the state machine will enter
an infinite loop. After validating that the private key and g have valid inverses modulo q,
the inverse of the private key and the polynomial g are used as inputs to the convolution
multiplication model along with p as the input scale quantity so that the calculation of the
public key, h = pfq ∗ g (mod q), is accomplished all at the same time. The private key, f ,
and public key, h, are then held valid on the output until the strtgen is driven low.
Figure 3.10: Block diagram for KGP1
The polynomial inversion modulo q model, shown in Figure 3.11, combines the algo-
rithms for polynomial division, Extended Euclidean Algorithm and inversion of a polyno-
mial modulo a prime as shown in Algorithm 3.3. The model takes a polynomial modulo
q as an input and is activated by a rising edge on the daclk input. The implementation
is behavioral, so the algorithm runs during one clock cycle and outputs the inverse of the
input polynomial and whether the inverse is valid. The inverse polynomial is held on the
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output and state is maintained, so the model should be reset to clear all stored values before
another inverse polynomial calculation is executed.
Figure 3.11: Block diagram for inversion mod q
During testing, the encryption operation model, shown in Figure 3.12, retrieves the
public key from the key generation primitive via the testbench. The testbench also provides
the input message, from testing data, to the encryption operation and drives the strtenc
signal to enable encryption. The message construct, M , and index generation function
seed data, sData, are formed and the seed data is sent directly to the index generation
function. The blinding polynomial generation method model is then activated, after which
the output blinding polynomial, r, is multiplied by the public key, h, using the convolution
multiplication model. The output modulo q, R, and modulo two, R2, are received from the
convolution multiplication model and R2 is run through the mask generation function and
masked with the message construct. Finally, the encryption operation forms the ciphertext,
e = R + i (mod q). An additional parameter, zeromsk, is pre-generated so that the mask
used in step m of the encryption operation, as shown in Figure 3.6, did not have to be
dynamically created for each parameter set.
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Figure 3.12: Block diagram for encryption operation
The decryption operation model, shown in Figure 3.13, is set up in the testbench to
accept the ciphertext, e, from the encryption operation model and the private key, f , from
the key generation primitive model. The decryption model uses internal states to execute
the decryption primitive to recover the candidate decrypted polynomial, ci. The candidate
value for r ∗ h is recovered by cR = e − ci and taken modulo two to be used in the mask
generation function. The resultant mask is XOR’ed with ci and the candidate message
construct, cM , is retrieved and held as an output from the decryption operation model.
Although the candidate message construct was verified manually using the testing data,
it should be noted that the blinding polynomial generation method model could easily be
integrated with the decryption operation model for automated verification of the data as
shown in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.13: Block diagram for decryption operation
3.2.4 System model testing and results
The behavioral VHDL model described in Section 3.2.3 was mainly tested using data pro-
vided for the IEEE 1363.1 draft standard. The four parameter sets that data was available
for were ees347ep2, ees397ep1, ees587ep1 and ees787ep1. Since testing data was not yet
available for product forms, the focus of the testing was conducted using the less optimized
full polynomial algorithms. The testbench used a series of constant assignments applied
through the generics for each individual component model to control the parameters for
testing.
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Figure 3.14: Sample testbench setup for ees587ep1
Although the model was successfully verified for ess347ep2, ees397ep1 and ess587ep1,
there were oddities found in the testing data which caused complications. The first unusual
was found in the Index Generation Function (IGF) integer output values. Using the hex
output values provided in the testing data, the hash algorithm output was verified and the
difference was discovered. At the boundaries where one hash output ended and another
began, an extra constant byte value was found to be inserted. The extra byte value required
compensation in the indexing of the IGF function for both the SHA-1 and SHA-256 variants
of the hash algorithm. Further complications developed when using a message that was less
than the maximum message length as found in the ees787ep1 data set. Although the model
created was able to handle messages of varying length, and was verified as being functional
with messages less than the maximum message length, the testing for ess787ep1 did not
match the expected results when generated indices using the IGF. Debugging using the hex
value outputs of the hash algorithm was not possible in this case because none of the values
matched. The message data being only one byte away from filling the maximum message
length, every value for a byte being appended to the beginning or to the end of the message
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was tried with no success. Although the testing data was very useful for verification of the
IEEE 1363.1 draft standard model, it is clear that additional work is needed to clean up
further test data sets.
Figure 3.15: Sample waveform output for ees587ep1
Presented in Figure 3.15 are the results for the ees587ep1 test data set. In addition to
the waveform data, text files were written for the private-key, public-key, ciphertext and
recovered plaintext data for verification.
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Chapter 4
Discussion and analysis
Throughout the investigation into the NTRU system and IEEE 1363.1 standard, a number
of topics arose which required further analysis. Some of the topics related directly to the
creation of the system model, while others were related to general issues in considering an
NTRU system. The purpose of this chapter is to provide in depth discussion and analysis
of select topics for which further consideration was needed.
4.1 System dependent design
Depending on the platform chosen to implement the NTRU system, a number of options
are available on how to design different pieces of the system. If a combined hardware
and software platform is available, there is a choice of what to implement in software and
what is more efficient in hardware. Primarily, there exists a trade-off between the ease
of implementation using software and potential higher performance using hardware in the
convolution multiplication operation, polynomial inversion operation and the support algo-
rithms of the IEEE 1363.1 draft standard. A discussion of a possible software method of
performing the convolution multiplication operation is presented in section 4.4, but it is not
clear that recent changes will not impact the performance of the algorithm or that hardware
cannot achieve better results. Discussion of the inversion operation can be found in section
4.3. While inversion can be quickly and simplistically implemented in software, there is a
performance advantage using a hardware implementation. The mask generation function
51
(MGF) and index generation function (IGF) support algorithms used in the IEEE 1363.1
draft standard are based on iterative calls to one of the SHA family of hash algorithms.
The SHA hash algorithms, the MGF and the IGF are all easily developed using software,
although better performance could be obtained through use of hardware implementations.
With respect to the total system, many of the choices for implementation of algorithms
in software or hardware are dependent on the resources available. When resources are
scarce, the entire system can be shifted towards a software implementation that will use
minimal hardware to perform all operations while sacrificing performance. In resource
abundant systems, a software version could obtain better performance through increased
usage of resources but more likely it would be appealing to convert algorithms to dedicated
hardware structures for increased performance. Since none of the pieces in the system
are particularly challenging in either hardware or software, the design of each algorithm is
flexible towards the requirements of the resources available. Sections 4.2 and 4.4 provide
further discussion of design aspects that are related to the type and amount of resources
available.
4.2 Storage methods and the relation to N and q
As mentioned in section 3.2.1, the method of storage and the amount of storage required
to implement the NTRU system can be of particular concern for those using resource con-
strained hardware or for those seeking to optimize performance. The trivial method of
storing polynomials is to store each coefficient in a linear array, taking N ∗ dlog2 (q)e or
N ∗ dlog2 (p)e bits of storage for a polynomial modulo q or p respectively. The appeal of
this method is the simplicity involved, however this is clearly not as appealing as the num-
ber of bits needed to store each coefficient or the degree of the polynomials increase. Using
the idea that many of the coefficients involved in a polynomial will be zero, an alternative
method is to store each non-zero coefficient and the degree that coefficient represents. As-
suming there were numnz percentage of non-zero coefficients, this method would require
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N ∗ (dlog2 (q)e + dlog2 (N)e) ∗ numnz or N ∗ (dlog2 (p)e + dlog2 (N)e) ∗ numnz bits of
storage per polynomial. To evaluate which method is better in a general manner is difficult
to imagine because the equations are based onN , p or q and numnz, which requires varying
of three input variables and assessment of the output amount of storage. Instead, to avoid
over complication during examination of the results, one of the three input variables can be
constant, a second can be varied and a graph can be made for each of a series of values for
the third value. The choice was made to hold a value for either p or q, vary N and graph
the results for a series of different values for numnz. To examine one of the extremes, the
results for p = 3 are shown in Figure 4.1. The data points used to generate the storage
graphs were taken from parameter sets found in [16].
Figure 4.1: Polynomial storage for p = 3
In a case where the number of bits required to store the polynomial coefficients is
much lower than the number of bits to store the index, the full storage method performs
well enough that an alternative method is not necessary. A more reasonable comparison is
found when comparing the two methods using polynomials modulo q = 256, as shown in
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Figure 4.2.
Figure 4.2: Polynomial storage for q = 256
The method of storing non-zero coefficients starts to become more appealing when
polynomials are reduced using a larger modulus. To prevent imbalances in the polyno-
mials which could lead to weaknesses to certain types of attacks, it is desirable that the
polynomials have a somewhat balanced number of zero and non-zero coefficients. Checks
implemented in the NTRU system usually use boundaries that a polynomial should con-
tain between 33% and 66% non-zero coefficients. From Figure 4.2, it appears that the two
methodologies are close to being equivalent, with the assumption that a general polynomial
would have around 50% non-zero coefficients. However, an issue exists in that while the
full storage methodology increases linearly with N , the method of storing only the non-
zero coefficients increases approximately O(N ∗ log2 (N)). As a consequence, even if the
methods are similar for lower degree polynomials, asN increases the methods will diverge
and the full storage method will eventually becomes significantly more efficient. From a
practical standpoint, it is not clear that polynomials of such a high degree would ever be
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used, so the concern may be purely academic. Of clear significance, a comparison of the
two methodologies for q = 2048 is shown in Figure 4.3.
Figure 4.3: Polynomial storage for q = 2048
For this case, the method of storing the polynomials by their non-zero coefficients
achieves slightly better results than storing the full polynomial. Indeed, the intersection
of the two metholodogies can be found rather easily by setting the storage requirements
equal to one another.
N ∗ (dlog2 (q)e) = N ∗ (dlog2 (q)e+ dlog2 (N)e) ∗ numnz
dlog2 (N)e = dlog2 (q)e ∗
(
1
numnz
− 1
)
numnz 33% 50% 66%
intersection point ≈ 2 ∗ (dlog2 (q)e) = dlog2 (q)e ≈ 12 ∗ (dlog2 (q)e)
intersection for (N, q=2048) N ≈ 4, 194, 304 N ≈ 2048 N ≈ 32
To obtain a case where one representation performs dramatically better than the other,
either q << N or N << q. Rather than choose one method to represent all polynomials,
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it would seem that it is better to dynamically choose the storage on whether the modulus
that the polynomial is reduced by is much larger than or much smaller than the degree
of the polynomial. If the reduction modulus and the degree are approximately the same,
then either method could be used. In hardware, the method of storing non-zero coefficients
and their degree may actually involve greater complexity and take longer to manage than
storing the full polynomial. In such a situation, it would be appealing to have N and q be
approximately the same or to have N << q. Having N << q in hardware also has the
appeal of reducing the clock cycles needed to iterate over a polynomial, which is much
more costly than increasing the size of q. Overall, hardware would benefit by choosing the
highest q value that fills the maximum bit operations supported and adjust the value of N
to change the security level, optimally keeping the value of N << q. Software would have
an easier time managing the polynomials stored by their non-zero coefficients and could
choose to pick a value of q and drive the value of N higher to change the security level
without concern for the polynomial storage method becoming less efficient.
The split between desiring q << N or N << q facilitates a discussion of the trade-off
between increasing N as compared to increasing q. As a basic example, Figure 4.4 shows
the trade-off of holding q constant while increasing N compared to holding N constant
while increasing q from a starting point of (N, q) = (251, 197).
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Figure 4.4: Trade-off in increasing value for (N, q) = (251, 197)
An initial look implies that the cost of increasing q is far less than the cost of increasing
N , but the trade-off must also be considered with respect to the benefit in security. If the
security is considered proportional to the search space required to brute force search for a
matching polynomial, then an idea of the effect on security can be gained from estimating
the search space of an (N, q) polynomial as the size of the coefficients multiplied by the
number of coefficients, N ∗ q. Now, either q or N can be incremented and the relative
difference can be examined. While in practice this is completely invalid because N should
always be a prime number and q and q + 1 most likely do not both fit the restraints on q, a
change by one should be scalable to a general integer.
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Polynomial space Estimate search space Difference from baseline
(N, q) N ∗ q –
(N + 1, q) (N + 1) ∗ q q
(N, q + 1) N ∗ (q + 1) N
Table 4.1: Comparison of estimated search spaces
The effect on the search space when changing N is dependent on the value of q, while
changes in q change the search space dependent on the value of N . If N and q are similar,
then there should be little difference between increasing N or increasing q with respect
to the search space. When q << N or when N << q, then a situation of decaying
returns exists until eventually increasing the higher valued variable any further will have
comparitively small effect on the search space in relation to an increase of the smaller
variable. A more specific relation between N , q and the lattice security of the system can
be found in Annex A, section 2.2.7 of the IEEE 1363.1 draft standard [14]. There are
two quantities introduced which are dependent on N and q and are used to experimentally
determine the effect of changes on N and q with relation to the lattice security.
c = ρ ∗ √2N
a = N/q
The specifics of these equations can be found in the standard, but the conclusion pre-
sented therein is that experimental results suggest that the lattice security is relative to the
quantities c and a. In order to increase lattice breaking times, it is suggested that the ratio
of N to q, a, should be held constant while increasing c. While this could be accomplished
by increasing N , it requires increasing q as well to maintain the ratio a. An increase in
both N and q causing an increase in security is consistent with the search space estima-
tion used above, and confirms the idea that increasing only N or q will have diminishing
returns. Additionally, it is stated that the experimental results found that hold c constant
and increasing a causes a slight decrease in lattice breaking times. If c is held constant, N
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must not be changing and therefore to increase a the value of q must be decreased, which
again is consistent with the search space estimation. An assumption can be made that the
opposite is true as well, holding c constant while decreasing a would slightly increase lat-
tice breaking times. Such an assumption suggests that trying to achieve higher security
levels through increases in q alone is not very efficient, but this is not entirely clear because
the search space estimation method suggests that it would also depend on the value of q
relative to N . Tracing the discussion back to [22], then it is further suggested that holding
a and c constant while increasing N yields increases in lattice breaking times. The results
shown illustrate the effect of increasing N , but not the case which is appealing to hard-
ware of holding N constant while increasing q. For further study and experimentation, the
parameter generation algorithm shown in [16] could be used.
4.3 Polynomial inversion
Inversion is an expensive operation in many cryptosystems, and such is the case for the
NTRU system. For key generation in NTRU, the inverse of the private key polynomial
must be taken modulo the large modulus, q. For security purposes, it is also checked that
the inverse of g exists modulo q. For now, two suggested algorithms exist for calculation of
the inverse, the Extended Euclidean Algorithm (EEA) and the Almost Inverse Algorithm
(AIA), of which only the EEA is recommended for use in the IEEE 1363.1 draft standard.
Although an implementation of each algorithm was tested during the course of this re-
search, they were not developed to the point where a reasonable comparison of hardware
results could be made. Instead, a comparison can be made by examining one iteration of
each algorithm in terms of the operations required. To start with, the general EEA presented
in Algorithm 3.3 can be compared with the general AIA presented in Algorithm 3.4.
59
Operation # in EEA # in AIA Steps found in
Integer inversion 1 1 EEA: Step 8
AIA: Step 10
Polynomial rotation 0 2 AIA: Step 4
Polynomial degree 1 2 EEA: Step 9
AIA: Steps 5 and 8
Polynomial 1/2 0/2 EEA: Step 13 / Steps 12 and 14
addition/subtraction AIA: Steps 11 and 12
Polynomial 2 2 EEA: Steps 12 and 14
convolution multiplication AIA: Steps 11 and 12
Table 4.2: Comparison of operations per iteration between inversion methods
From the comparison in Table 4.2, it might be thought that the Almost Inverse Algo-
rithm contains more work per iteration than the Extended Euclidean Algorithm. The AIA
has two polynomial rotations and one polynomial degree calculation more than the EEA,
but one fewer polynomial addition. Note that the caclulation in Step 11 of the EEA appears
to have a polynomial rotation, but this is actually just an assignment of one coefficient of
the polynomial v. In addition, there is final work done in Step 20 of the EEA and in Steps 6
and 7 of the AIA, of which both have an integer inversion and polynomial scale operation
but the AIA has an additional polynomial rotation operation. While this could be consid-
ered a fair comparison of the main loops of each algorithm, what it ignores is the inner
loop inside the EEA. The inner loop of the EEA contains a polynomial degree calculation,
a polynomial addition, a polynomial subtraction and a polynomial convolution multiplica-
tion. Assuming the inner loop executes at least twice on a given iteration of the EEA, the
AIA achieves inversion through fewer computations.
When working with the inverse, considerations should be made for raising a polyno-
mial inverse result modulo a prime to a power of a prime, per the recommendations of [16].
Using Algorithm 3.2, a result can be raised to a power of a prime in approximately log2 (r)
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steps for a polynomial modulo pr. Per iteration, there are two polyomial convolution multi-
plication operations, one polynomial scaling and one polynomial subtraction. The polyno-
mial scaling can be achieved at almost no cost in hardware because it is a multiplication by
two. Further savings can be achieved by observing that a polynomial convolution squaring
may be less computationally expensive than a polynomial convolution multiplication. If N
is an odd prime, then the coefficients of the square of a polynomial a(X) can be computed
as follows, where the subscripts shown should be taken modulo N .
a(X)2k = a
2
N−2k + 2(aN−2k−1 · aN−2k+1) + 2(aN−2k−2 · aN−2k+2) + ...
+2(aN−2k−N−2
2
· aN−2k+N−2
2
) + 2(aN−2k−N−1
2
· aN−2k+N−1
2
)
Using the basic convolution multiplication operation, a squaring would take approximately
N2 operations. With the squaring equation shown above, the inner loop of the equation
can be reduced to approximately N/2 operations, leading to an overall number of approxi-
mately
N2
2
operations.
4.4 Considerations for parallelism
The NTRU system has many pieces which can be implemented in either a serial style or
a parallel style. In addition to adjusting system parameters to provide flexibility in se-
curity and performance, this also means that the calculations themselves can be adjusted
to provide flexibility in performance. Essentially all of the polynomial operations require
independent iterative calculations on the polynomial operands, lending themselves to par-
allel implementation. When designing a system around the IEEE 1363.1 draft standard,
additional parallelism can be achieved in the support algorithms.
Polynomial addition, subtraction and modular reduction all require an iteration through
all of the coefficients of one or more polynomials, calculating results for each degree which
are independent of each other. Any or all of these can be executed simultaneously through
the instantiation of multiple pieces of hardware to calculate the result. An additional tech-
nique that could be used with the addition or subtraction of polynomials is the computation
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of multiple output coefficients using the same addition or subtraction unit. For instance,
if the unsigned coefficients of a polynomial are represented using 8 bits, then two coeffi-
cients could be concatenated together and used as inputs to a 16 bit addition unit. A similar
method could be used for subtraction, however the carry would not be propagated between
coefficient boundaries.
Parallelism for polynomial convolution multiplication can easily be achieved as well.
In [11], a design for a convolution multiplier with flexibility in the number of coefficients
that can be computed simultaneously is introduced.
Figure 4.5: Scalable convolution multiplier [11]
The design allows loading of a modulo p operand through a multiplexer into a circular
shift register, while a modulo q operand is stored in a look-up table. The control logic is
designed to control each arithmetic unit to calculate one coefficient of the result in N + 8
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clock cycles, for a total of N ∗ (N + 8) clock cylcles for a complete convolution mul-
tiplication with one arithmetic unit. The total number of clock cycles taken for multiple
arithmetic units is (N +8)(dN/ke) + k− 1 for k arithmetic units. The design is appealing
because of the flexibility in calculating a single or multiple output coefficients at once, but
there are some easily changed drawbacks that are caused by the restrictive nature of the
system the multiplier was designed for. To save storage room, the multiplier uses a look-up
table for one of the operands, which could easily be modified to use a memory block. The
restriction on multiplying only a modulo p polynomial by a modulo q polynomial can be
modified by extending the circular shift register to fit a modulo q polynomial. This would
affect the arithmetic units as well but should not change the control logic other than the
number of bits that the circular shift register is moved when changing coefficients. The
last modification that would be appealing is to add in the ability to input a scalar quantity
that can be multiplied with each output coefficient for computation of results similar to the
creation of the public key, h = pfq ∗ g (mod q). A final comment on the design is that it
does not efficiently handle the number of zero coefficients that are found in the operands.
In IEEE 1363.1, it is almost gauranteed that the input operands will have between 33% and
66% non-zero coefficients, which means that significantly better speed might be achieved
by ignoring calculations in which one of the input coefficients is zero.
An alternative approach is taken in [26], which also can be used to exploit parallelism.
Figure 4.6 shows the general concept of computing a convolution multiplication through
the use of only additions and rotations of the modulo q input polynomial.
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Figure 4.6: a*b using polynomial additions and rotations [26]
By examining the patterns that are found in the coefficients of the modulo p operand,
partial results can be computed and reused if the same bit pattern is found in the modulo p
operand again. Figure 4.7 shows an example wherein the partial result (a + X2a) is used
twice to compute the output a ∗ b. In comparison to the method which does not use bit
patterns, this saves one addition and one rotation. If the patterns are found and the partial
results are calculated simultaneously, this method achieves significant speed advantage over
the naive nested loop method of computing the product.
Figure 4.7: a*b using bit patterns [26]
While this is effective using binary polynomials, the chances of finding the same pattern
multiple times in a ternary polynomial are not as good. Although this would reduce the
efficiency of the algorithm, testing needs to be done to determine the impact.
64
The mask generation function (MGF) and index generation function (IGF) of the IEEE
1363.1 draft standard call a hash function a number of calculated times. The input to the
hash algorithm is fed the same input data each time except that a counter is appended and
incremented during each iteration. Since the output of each successive call is not dependent
on the cycle before, the hash outputs could be calculated in parallel. For lower security pa-
rameter sets, the MGF is often only called once and each hash output of the IGF is used to
calculate multiple indices, meaning that parallelism would not provide much, if any, per-
formance benefit. Higher security sets, which would use larger values for N and q, might
require multiple hash outputs from the MGF and each hash output of the IGF may pro-
vide few indices, perhaps allowing parallelism to provide significant benefits. Since higher
security parameter sets would most likely be used on high performance systems, the cost
of implementing simultaneous hash algorithms would most likely be minimal compared to
the available hardware resources.
A final consideration for parallelism can be found with respect to key generation in the
IEEE 1363.1 draft standard. During key generation, calculation and inversion of the private
key, f , can be done while the random polynomial, g, is generated, inverted and checked for
suitability. Two sets of inversion hardware, or pipelining of one set of inversion hardware,
would allow the calculations to be more efficiently completed.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Presented in this thesis is a parameter and component flexible testing model for the NTRU
Public-Key Cryptosystem in conformance to the IEEE 1363.1 draft standard. The model
was successfully tested using provided and generated test data sets and is now adaptable for
further software and hardware research. Research conducted during creation and testing of
the model was used to analyze the NTRU system with respect to both general underlying
mathematical operations and specific qualities relating to the IEEE 1363.1 draft standard.
The results of the research suggest that the system is highly adaptable to many conditions
based on choices in the system parameters. Representation of the polynomial operands
can be chosen to maximize storage efficiency. Hardware implementations benefit by using
the maximum value of q which fits the bit width allowable in the hardware, followed by
adjustment in N to achieve the desired security level. Parallelism in the operations of the
system can be exploited to achieve better efficiency but must be carefully considered to
avoid complications when adapting to new parameter sets. Overall, the work presented
here can be used as underlying research for further investigation of the NTRU system and
IEEE 1363.1 draft standard.
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5.1 Future of NTRU
Although the NTRU Public-key Cryptosystem has been around for a short period of time
compared to other classical cryptosystems, it seems to have enough support to be a last-
ing entity. Due to the system being in the early stages, the recommended implementation
characteristics and suggested practices are still changing rapidly but the underlying math-
ematical concepts do not appear to be in question. Implementation of NTRU in resource
constrained hardware is an active area of development and may lead to usage in a number
of wired and wireless applications. Discussion has also begun about the advantages of the
NTRU system compared to classical systems in a quantum computing environment. Al-
though the integer factorization and discrete logarithm problems that many classical cryp-
tosystems are based on have known efficient algorithms for solving in a quantum comput-
ing environment, it is unclear whether such an algorithm will be found to solve the closest
vector and shortest vector problems that are used in the NTRU cryptosystem. Certainly,
additional in depth research will need to be conducted and circulated in order to further
evaluate the NTRU system.
5.2 Future work
Although previous research efforts have been tightly focused, the opportunities for further
research are quite extensive. Extensions to the work presented in this thesis can be done in
either software, hardware or a mixture of both. Software work might continue with further
investigation of product form polynomials. Additional component focused work could be
done to explore new methods and optimize performance of existing components, of which
the polynomial convolution multiplication and inversion components are most likely of
highest interest. An exploration of optimizations over the software/hardware boundary
could be conducted to seek optimal performance or a purely hardware solution might be
sought through conversion of the current model to purely structural code.
More general topics of research may include additional research into the possibility of
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modified or new parameter sets and integration of NTRU with a private-key scheme. Pa-
rameters sets which use higher values for p which could fit a nibble or byte worth of data
may be appealing instead of adapting binary information to ternary representation. An effi-
cient implementation of NTRU alongside a private-key scheme could provide a maximum
efficiency complete cryptographic solution for communication establishment and continu-
ous data transfer.
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